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Main article: Epistemology. Main article: Philosophy of science. For the Donna Haraway essay, see Situated Knowledges. This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
June Learn how and when to remove this template message. Main article: Knowledge in Islam. Main category: Knowledge. Archived from the original on 14 July Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 13 June Retrieved 30 June Each of these definitions is shown to be unsatisfactory. October New Series. JSTOR Proceedings of the Archived from the original PDF on 24 May Retrieved 24 May Retrieved 16 July Five Dialogues.
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. ISBN Retrieved 24 February American Philosophical Quarterly. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 8 July However, this may lead to problems whenever the topic spills over into those excluded domains — e. It also seems likely that the vexed problem of " infinite regress " can be largely but not completely solved by proper attention to how unconscious concepts are actually developed, both during infantile learning and as inherited "pseudo-transcendentals" inherited from the trial-and-error of previous generations.
See also " Tacit knowledge ". Piaget, J. The child's conception of time. The child's conception of space. Haraway, Donna. Feminist Studies Vol. Escobar, Arturo. Feminism and Technoscience. Cambridge University Press, , — Foucault, Michel. Critical Inquiry Volume 9, No. Catechism of the Catholic Church.
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Namespaces Article Talk. For example, if a lawyer employs sophistry to induce a jury into a belief that happens to be true, this belief is insufficiently well-grounded to constitute knowledge. There is considerable disagreement among epistemologists concerning what the relevant sort of justification here consists in. Internalists about justification think that whether a belief is justified depends wholly on states in some sense internal to the subject.
Conee and Feldman present an example of an internalist view. Given their not unsubstantial assumption that what evidence a subject has is an internal matter, evidentialism implies internalism. Propositional justification concerns whether a subject has sufficient reason to believe a given proposition; [ 9 ] doxastic justification concerns whether a given belief is held appropriately. The precise relation between propositional and doxastic justification is subject to controversy, but it is uncontroversial that the two notions can come apart.
Suppose that Ingrid ignores a great deal of excellent evidence indicating that a given neighborhood is dangerous, but superstitiously comes to believe that the neighborhood is dangerous when she sees a black cat crossing the street. Since knowledge is a particularly successful kind of belief, doxastic justification is a stronger candidate for being closely related to knowledge; the JTB theory is typically thought to invoke doxastic justification but see Lowy This view is sometimes motivated by the thought that, when we consider whether someone knows that p , or wonder which of a group of people know that p , often, we are not at all interested in whether the relevant subjects have beliefs that are justified; we just want to know whether they have the true belief.
One could allow that there is a lightweight sense of knowledge that requires only true belief; another option is to decline to accept the intuitive sentences as true at face value. In what follows, we will set aside the lightweight sense, if indeed there be one, and focus on the stronger one.
Few contemporary epistemologists accept the adequacy of the JTB analysis. Although most agree that each element of the tripartite theory is necessary for knowledge, they do not seem collectively to be sufficient. There seem to be cases of justified true belief that still fall short of knowledge. Here is one kind of example:.
Imagine that we are seeking water on a hot day. We suddenly see water, or so we think. In fact, we are not seeing water but a mirage, but when we reach the spot, we are lucky and find water right there under a rock. Can we say that we had genuine knowledge of water? The answer seems to be negative, for we were just lucky. This example comes from the Indian philosopher Dharmottara, c. The 14 th -century Italian philosopher Peter of Mantua presented a similar case:.
Let it be assumed that Plato is next to you and you know him to be running, but you mistakenly believe that he is Socrates, so that you firmly believe that Socrates is running. However, let it be so that Socrates is in fact running in Rome; however, you do not know this. Gettier presented two cases in which a true belief is inferred from a justified false belief.
He observed that, intuitively, such beliefs cannot be knowledge; it is merely lucky that they are true. Since they appear to refute the JTB analysis, many epistemologists have undertaken to repair it: how must the analysis of knowledge be modified to accommodate Gettier cases? Above, we noted that one role of the justification is to rule out lucky guesses as cases of knowledge. A lesson of the Gettier problem is that it appears that even true beliefs that are justified can nevertheless be epistemically lucky in a way inconsistent with knowledge.
Epistemologists who think that the JTB approach is basically on the right track must choose between two different strategies for solving the Gettier problem. The first is to strengthen the justification condition to rule out Gettier cases as cases of justified belief.
There are examples of Gettier cases that need involve no inference; therefore, there are possible cases of justified true belief without knowledge, even though condition iv is met. Suppose, for example, that James, who is relaxing on a bench in a park, observes an apparent dog in a nearby field. So he believes. Suppose further that the putative dog is actually a robot dog so perfect that it could not be distinguished from an actual dog by vision alone.
Given these assumptions, d is of course false. And since this belief is based on ordinary perceptual processes, most epistemologists will agree that it is justified. If so, then the JTB account, even if supplemented with iv , gives us the wrong result that James knows d. Suppose there is a county in the Midwest with the following peculiar feature.
The landscape next to the road leading through that county is peppered with barn-facades: structures that from the road look exactly like barns. Observation from any other viewpoint would immediately reveal these structures to be fakes: devices erected for the purpose of fooling unsuspecting motorists into believing in the presence of barns. Suppose Henry is driving along the road that leads through Barn County.
Naturally, he will on numerous occasions form false beliefs in the presence of barns. Since Henry has no reason to suspect that he is the victim of organized deception, these beliefs are justified. Now suppose further that, on one of those occasions when he believes there is a barn over there, he happens to be looking at the one and only real barn in the county.
This time, his belief is justified and true. Yet condition iv is met in this case. His belief is not the result of any inference from a falsehood. Once again, we see that iv does not succeed as a general solution to the Gettier problem. Another candidate fourth condition on knowledge is sensitivity.
Sensitivity, to a first approximation, is this counterfactual relation:. A sensitivity condition on knowledge was defended by Robert Nozick Given a Lewisian Lewis semantics for counterfactual conditionals, the sensitivity condition is equivalent to the requirement that, in the nearest possible worlds in which not- p , the subject does not believe that p. One motivation for including a sensitivity condition in an analysis of knowledge is that there seems to be an intuitive sense in which knowledge requires not merely being correct, but tracking the truth in other possible circumstances.
This approach seems to be a plausible diagnosis of what goes wrong in at least some Gettier cases. For if there were no water there, you would have held the same belief on the same grounds— viz. However, it is doubtful that a sensitivity condition can account for the phenomenon of Gettier cases in general. It does so only in cases in which, had the proposition in question been false, it would have been believed anyway. But, as Saul Kripke —68 has pointed out, not all Gettier cases are like this.
Consider for instance the Barn County case mentioned above. Henry looks at a particular location where there happens to be a barn and believes there to be a barn there. The sensitivity condition rules out this belief as knowledge only if, were there no barn there, Henry would still have believed there was. But this counterfactual may be false, depending on how the Barn County case is set up.
We assume Henry is unaware that colour signifies anything relevant. Since intuitively, the former belief looks to fall short of knowledge in just the same way as the latter, a sensitivity condition will only handle some of the intuitive problems deriving from Gettier cases. Most epistemologists today reject sensitivity requirements on knowledge. For example, George, who can see and use his hands perfectly well, knows that he has hands. Now imagine a skeptical scenario in which George does not have hands.
Suppose that George is the victim of a Cartesian demon, deceiving him into believing that he has hands. If George were in such a scenario, of course, he would falsely believe himself not to be in such a scenario. So given the sensitivity condition, George cannot know that he is not in such a scenario.
Although these two verdicts—the knowledge-attributing one about ordinary knowledge, and the knowledge-denying one about the skeptical scenario—are arguably each intuitive, it is intuitively problematic to hold them together. A sensitivity condition on knowledge, combined with the nonskeptical claim that there is ordinary knowledge, seems to imply such abominable conjunctions. Most contemporary epistemologists have taken considerations like these to be sufficient reason to reject sensitivity conditions.
Although few epistemologists today endorse a sensitivity condition on knowledge, the idea that knowledge requires a subject to stand in a particular modal relation to the proposition known remains a popular one. Sosa characterized safety as the counterfactual contrapositive of sensitivity. Sensitivity: If p were false, S would not believe that p. Safety: If S were to believe that p , p would not be false. An example of a safe belief that is not sensitive, according to Sosa, is the belief that a distant skeptical scenario does not obtain.
Notice that although we stipulated that George is not at risk of deceit by Cartesian demons, we did not stipulate that George himself had any particular access to this fact. Characterizing safety in these counterfactual terms depends on substantive assumptions about the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. Rather than resting on a contentious treatment of counterfactuals, then, it may be most perspicuous to understand the safety condition more directly in these modal terms, as Sosa himself often does:.
In all nearby worlds where S believes that p , p is not false. The status of potential counterexamples will not always be straightforward to apply. The host does not want Michael to find the party. Suppose Michael never shows up.
Had he merely made a slightly different choice about his costume, he would have been deceived. However, it is open to a safety theorist to argue that the relevant skeptical scenario, though possible and in some sense nearby, is not near enough in the relevant respect to falsify the safety condition. Such a theorist would, if she wanted the safety condition to deliver clear verdicts, face the task of articulating just what the relevant notion of similarity amounts to see also Bogardus Not all further clarifications of a safety condition will be suitable for the use of the latter in an analysis of knowledge.
In particular, if the respect of similarity that is relevant for safety is itself explicated in terms of knowledge, then an analysis of knowledge which made reference to safety would be in this respect circular. This, for instance, is how Timothy Williamson characterizes safety. He writes, in response to a challenge by Alvin Goldman:. In many cases, someone with no idea of what knowledge is would be unable to determine whether safety obtained.
Although they could use the principle that safety entails truth to exclude some cases, those are not the interesting ones. Thus Goldman will be disappointed when he asks what the safety account predicts about various examples in which conflicting considerations pull in different directions. One may have to decide whether safety obtains by first deciding whether knowledge obtains, rather than vice versa. Williamson Because safety is understood only in terms of knowledge, safety so understood cannot serve in an analysis of knowledge.
This is of course consistent with claiming that safety is a necessary condition on knowledge in the straightforward sense that the latter entails the former. Significant early proponents of this view include Stine , Goldman , and Dretske To be able to know by sight that a particular phone is the 6S model, it is natural to suppose that one must be able to tell the difference between the iPhone 6S and the iPhone 7; the possibility that the phone in question is a newer model is a relevant alternative.
Notice that in these cases and many of the others that motivate the relevant-alternatives approach to knowledge, there is an intuitive sense in which the relevant alternatives tend to be more similar to actuality than irrelevant ones. As such, the relevant alternatives theory and safety-theoretic approaches are very similar, both in verdict and in spirit. As in the case of a safety theorist, the relevant alternatives theorist faces a challenge in attempting to articulate what determines which possibilities are relevant in a given situation.
As we have seen, one motivation for including a justification condition in an analysis of knowledge was to prevent lucky guesses from counting as knowledge. However, the Gettier problem shows that including a justification condition does not rule out all epistemically problematic instances of luck. Consequently, some epistemologists have suggested that positing a justification condition on knowledge was a false move; perhaps it is some other condition that ought to be included along with truth and belief as components of knowledge.
This kind of strategy was advanced by a number of authors from the late s to the early s, although there has been relatively little discussion of it since. One candidate property for such a state is reliability. Part of what is problematic about lucky guesses is precisely that they are so lucky: such guesses are formed in a way such that it is unlikely that they should turn out true. According to a certain form of knowledge reliabilism, it is unreliability, not lack of justification, which prevents such beliefs from amounting to knowledge.
Reliabilist theories of knowledge incorporate this idea into a reliability condition on knowledge. Simple K-Reliabilism replaces the justification clause in the traditional tripartite theory with a reliability clause. As we have seen, reliabilists about justification think that justification for a belief consists in a genesis in a reliable cognitive process. However, the present proposal is silent on justification. Goldman is the seminal defense of reliabilism about justification; reliabilism is extended to knowledge in Goldman See Goldman for a survey of reliabilism in general.
In the following passage, Fred Dretske articulates how an approach like K-reliabilism might be motivated:. Who needs it, and why? If an animal inherits a perfectly reliable belief-generating mechanism, and it also inherits a disposition, everything being equal, to act on the basis of the beliefs so generated, what additional benefits are conferred by a justification that the beliefs are being produced in some reliable way? If there are no additional benefits, what good is this justification?
Why should we insist that no one can have knowledge without it? Dretske According to Dretske, reliable cognitive processes convey information, and thus endow not only humans, but nonhuman animals as well, with knowledge. He writes:. I wanted a characterization that would at least allow for the possibility that animals a frog, rat, ape, or my dog could know things without my having to suppose them capable of the more sophisticated intellectual operations involved in traditional analyses of knowledge.
It does seem odd to think of frogs, rats, or dogs as having justified or unjustified beliefs. So if, with Dretske, we want an account of knowledge that includes animals among the knowing subjects, we might want to abandon the traditional JTB account in favor of something like K-reliabilism. Another move in a similar spirit to K-Reliabilism replaces the justification clause in the JTB theory with a condition requiring a causal connection between the belief and the fact believed; [ 24 ] this is the approach of Goldman , Instead, consider a simplified causal theory of knowledge, which illustrates the main motivation behind causal theories.
Although some proponents have suggested they do—see e. Consider again the case of the barn facades. This belief is formed by perceptual processes, which are by-and-large reliable: only rarely do they lead him into false beliefs. So it looks like the case meets the conditions of Simple K-Reliabilism just as much as it does those of the JTB theory. It is also a counterexample to the causal theory, since the real barn Henry perceives is causally responsible for his belief.
There is reason to doubt, therefore, that shifting from justification to a condition like reliability will escape the Gettier problem. We have seen already how several of these attempts failed. When intuitive counterexamples were proposed to each theory, epistemologists often responded by amending their theories, complicating the existing conditions or adding new ones.
Much of this dialectic is chronicled thoroughly by Shope , to which the interested reader is directed. After some decades of such iterations, some epistemologists began to doubt that progress was being made. She offered what was in effect a recipe for constructing Gettier cases:. Zagzebski suggests that the resultant case will always represent an intuitive lack of knowledge. So any non-redundant addition to the JTB theory will leave the Gettier problem unsolved. Zagzebski invites us to imagine that Mary has very good eyesight—good enough for her cognitive faculties typically to yield knowledge that her husband is sitting in the living room.
Such faculties, even when working properly in suitable environments, however, are not infallible—if they were, the condition would not be independent from truth—so we can imagine a case in which they go wrong. This belief, since false, is certainly not knowledge.
Since the recipe is a general one, it appears to be applicable to any condition one might add to the JTB theory, so long as it does not itself entail truth. Although it would represent a significant departure from much analytic epistemology of the late twentieth century, it is not clear that this is ultimately a particularly radical suggestion. Few concepts of interest have proved susceptible to traditional analysis Fodor If it does, then it will of course be impossible to start with a case that has justified false belief.
This kind of approach is not at all mainstream, but it does have its defenders—see e. Sutton and Littlejohn defend factive approaches to justification on other grounds. Indeed, we have already seen some such attempts, albeit unsuccessful ones. For instance, the causal theory of knowledge includes a clause requiring that the belief that p be caused by the fact that p. One family of strategies along these lines would build into an analysis of knowledge a prohibition on epistemic luck directly; let us consider this sort of move in more detail.
Zagzebski herself outlines this option in her p. Unger gives an early analysis of this kind. For example:. Rather than composing knowledge from various independent components, this analysis demands instead that the epistemic states are related to one another in substantive ways.
The anti-luck condition, like the safety condition of the previous section, is vague as stated. For one thing, whether a belief is true by luck comes in degrees—just how much luck does it take to be inconsistent with knowledge? Furthermore, it seems, independently of questions about degrees of luck, we must distinguish between different kinds of luck. Not all epistemic luck is incompatible with having knowledge. Suppose someone enters a raffle and wins an encyclopedia, then reads various of its entries, correcting many of their previous misapprehensions.
There is a straightforward sense in which the resultant beliefs are true only by luck—for our subject was very lucky to have won that raffle—but this is not the sort of luck, intuitively, that interferes with the possession of knowledge. But unless we are to capitulate to radical skepticism, it seems that this sort of luck, too, ought to be considered compatible with knowledge.
Like the safety condition, then, a luck condition ends up being difficult to apply in some cases. We might try to clarify the luck condition as involving a distinctive notion of epistemic luck—but unless we were able to explicate that notion—in effect, to distinguish between the two kinds of luck mentioned above—without recourse to knowledge, it is not clear that the ensuing analysis of knowledge could be both informative and noncircular. As our discussion so far makes clear, one standard way of evaluating attempted analyses of knowledge has given a central role to testing it against intuitions against cases.
Some of the more recent attempts to analyse knowledge have been motivated in part by broader considerations about the role of knowledge, or of discourse about knowledge. One important view of this sort is that defended by Edward Craig In particular, Craig suggested that the point of using the category of knowledge was for people to flag reliable informants—to help people know whom to trust in matters epistemic.
Craig defends an account of knowledge that is designed to fill this role, even though it is susceptible to intuitive counterexamples. The plausibility of such accounts, with a less intuitive extension but with a different kind of theoretical justification, is a matter of controversy.
Another view worth mentioning in this context is that of Hilary Kornblith , which has it that knowledge is a natural kind, to be analysed the same way other scientific kinds are. Intuition has a role to play in identifying paradigms, but generalizing from there is an empirical, scientific matter, and intuitive counterexamples are to be expected.
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